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Introduction
The first sign of a biological weapons or bioterrorism attack may be as inconspicuous as a flag on a computer screen in a small community. Yet this seemingly innocuous and lonely signal could mark the beginning of a national public health nightmare and response to a biological weapons attack. A bioterrorism attack may sneak up on cat's paws, following an insidious and unpredictable course and making itself known slowly and intermittently over a period of days or weeks. It may appear in places as disparate as doctor's offices, health clinics, and hospital emergency rooms. If not contained, its effects could spread to others not initially exposed, causing an epidemic and threat to our national security and the survival of our population.'
The initial impacts of a bioterrorism attack are likely to fall on emergency medical personnel rather than traditional first responders.
2 Defending against such an attack requires a strong public health and medical infrastructure. Robust and sensitive disease and epidemiological surveillance systems, or bio-surveillance, are critical to this infrastructure because they can detect such attacks early on and quickly identify and distinguish between naturally occurring diseases and intentional releases. Disease surveillance involves the ongoing systematic collection, analysis, and interpretation of specific data needed to plan and implement public health measures. Epidemiology studies the prevalence and spread of disease in a community, its causes, modes of transmission, and distribution. 3 Laboratory networks and knowledgeable health care professionals who can determine populations at risk and when person to person spread may occur are also key components of this infrastructure. 4 This paper reviews different bio-surveillance programs that are being planned or implemented throughout government and in the private sector and proposes policy -recommendations to improve and strengthen these efforts.
Bioterrorism Threats and Public Health Protection
The United States (U.S.) faces daunting challenges in preparing for biological terrorism.
Technological advances will make biological weapons more lethal, accessible, and affordable and future attacks will likely involve diseases that occur infrequently in nature. Medical and public health authorities may have limited experience dealing with these diseases because they won't follow known epidemiological patterns. Even worse, outbreaks could occur simultaneously in multiple locations, which is less likely in a natural epidemic. 
Bio-surveillance and Detection Systems
The national concept of operations for an early bioterrorism response relies heavily on bio-surveillance to detect attacks. Surveillance to detect, collect, analyze, and interpret reports of bio-events and trained staffs to monitor disease outbreaks is the foundation of epidemiology.
The concept is that sudden spikes in everyday aches and pains may signal the early stages of a massive biological attack. Epidemiologists call this strategy "syndromic" surveillance because it looks for increases in clusters of symptoms or "syndromes," rather than particular disease diagnoses.
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Both passive and active bio-surveillance systems are used throughout the country.
Passive systems rely on voluntary disease reporting from health care providers, but are notorious for low sensitivity, lack of timeliness, and minimal coverage. 14 Since passive systems are relatively inexpensive, they comprise the majority of surveillance systems, but are not very reliable because physicians and hospitals frequently fail to make an initial report or do so in a timely manner. 15 Active bio-surveillance, on the other hand, requires the active search for and identification of new cases and provides more timely and accurate information, but it also requires more trained epidemiologists and health care workers to collect, compile, and analyze the data needed to determine` the source of the biological agent. '6 In recent years, the number of health threat surveillance and detection programs implemented nationwide has increased. Many are funded and sponsored by the federal government in cooperation with the state and local public health and medical communities. At the local level, bio-surveillance systems often audit fluctuations in hospital admissions, monitor incoming patients, and draw data from emergency management system activity levels. 17 State health departments use bio-surveillance to identify statewide hospital admission rates and map the geographic and temporal evolution of diseases. This helps to differentiate disease patterns and determine if a disease is contagious and natural. 18 Below is a discussion of some sample federal, state, and local bio-surveillance activities.
Federal Activities
The CDC funds several programs designed to improve bio-surveillance capabilities. Pennsylvania. This program is the first on this scale to operate under homeland security legislation authorizing states to institute programs to detect bioterrorism threats, disease outbreaks, and epidemics. 37 In a third example, Johns Hopkins University and the University of Maryland will partner on a bio-surveillance project in the Baltimore area. 38 Each of these examples illustrates serious attempts to help secure the nation from bioterrorism threats, but more attention is needed.
Recommendations for Improving Capabilities in Bioterrorism Surveillance
In today's dangerous world, we must not lose sight of the fact that infectious diseases anywhere can threaten public health everywhere and that threats to public health also threaten national security. The worldwide emergence of new infectious diseases and the re-emergence of old ones led a recent National Intelligence Estimate to conclude that new and emerging infectious diseases pose a rising global threat and will complicate U.S. and global security in the next 20 years. 39 We must continue to upgrade our bio-surveillance capabilities, not only for detection of bioterrorist attacks and national security, but also to manage natural disease epidemics. As George White Jr., Director of Public Health Programs at the University of Utah, correctly pointed out, "An early surveillance system all across America will be an unbelievable benefit for us in combating natural diseases, and a sheer necessity to respond rapidly and appropriately to biological agents." 40 While it is certainly reassuring to see such a high level of bio-surveillance program activity, there remains an urgent need to do more. Since the front lines of bioterrorism defense are at the state and local levels, this is where efforts must be focused to upgrade public health and medical bio-surveillance capabilities. The core capacities of the medical and public health infrastructure need to be augmented with additional training and resources to support continued i mprovement of bio-surveillance capabilities. Beyond this, it is important for the federal government to assume a much stronger leadership role and more effectively coordinate all of the different bio-surveillance efforts that are underway across the nation. These recommendations are discussed in more detail below.
A national core of first responders and public health and medical providers should be trained to recognize clusters of symptoms and unusual diseases that may portend an emerging health problem or signal a biological attack. Partnership activities and training are needed to reinforce the vital link and close cooperation that is so important between the public health community and medical providers so that each understands the importance of supporting the other in detecting bioterrorism. 41 Distance learning provided through medical, public health, and academic associations can facilitate training and the formation of closer partnerships.
CDC should increase efforts to enhance epidemiological expertise and upgrade diagnostic lab capacities and collaboration, especially at the local level. Development of standard reporting formats, more highly integrated and reliable communications and data management systems, and more comprehensive computer linkages will facilitate rapid collection, analysis, and information exchange between labs, public health departments, the medical provider community and research facilities. Regional centers should be established for quick data compilation and analysis and forging of necessary communications links. 42 The entire medical and public health care community must be connected to HAN and EPI-X and the public health, medical, and scientific communities must work in closer partnership to research biological agents and diseases. 43 Greater cooperation in all areas can produce bio-surveillance, predictive, and detection devices with dual uses in national security and routine health care. 44 All states should enact the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA), which gives states increased legal powers to detect and contain bioterrorism and natural disease outbreaks. MSEHPA also contains specific provisions on surveillance activities. 45 Most importantly, strategic leadership and strong commitment are needed at the federal level to achieve the cohesion and coordination needed to improve bio-surveillance and related activities. Experts stress that it is not so much that new programs are needed, but a more coordinated approach that improves and augments current programs. 46 In 2001, the Secretary of HHS appointed a special assistant to coordinate bioterrorism programs and established a command center to monitor bioterrorist attack information. 7 This is a step in the right direction, but falls short of what is needed. A "bioterrorism czar" with greater authority and national visibility, perhaps even reporting to the President, is needed. This person would be responsible for coalescing the fragmented bio-surveillance and related preparedness activities into a comprehensive public/private national program and serving as the national advocate for obtaining the additional resources needed for improvement. Upgrading our nation's biosurveillance capabilities should be a national goal pursued with the same vigor as missile defense and landing a man on the moon. This effort must be viewed in the context of funding to improve health, defense, and homeland security since it will serve to help deepen the nations's protective shield and defenses against bioterrorism.
Conclusion
Biological weapons attacks may be very ambiguous and difficult to distinguish from natural disease outbreaks. Whether natural or intentional, rapid and accurate detection and.
analysis of disease threats will be critical to protecting health and safety. Protecting this country from acts of bioterrorism will require fully coordinated, creative, and collaborative public/private programs that maximize bio-surveillance and detection tools. Public health is a critical pillar of the national security framework. The future health and prosperity of this nation may well depend on how strong we make this pillar. 
